On the Alleged Error of Formal Objections to Normative Error Theory

Manuscrito 46 (2):109-121 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to Streumer and Wodak, a particular type of formal objection to normative error theory fails because it rests on a questionable assumption about the logical duality of the normative concepts of permissibility and impermissibility. In this discussion, we argue that there is an error in their indictment; as such, the formal objection to normative error theory might still prevail.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,937

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Error Theory, Unbelievability and the Normative Objection.Daniele Bruno - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (2).
Can We Defend Normative Error Theory?Joshua Taccolini - 2024 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 20 (1):131-154.
Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgments.Bart Streumer - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Can We Believe the Error Theory?Bart Streumer - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):194-212.
We believe the error theory.John Alton Christmann - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (5):632-644.
Why we can still believe the error theory.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):523-536.
Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory.Bart Streumer - 2017 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-07-22

Downloads
16 (#1,191,247)

6 months
10 (#407,001)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jeremiah Joven Joaquin
De La Salle University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Attributing error without taking a stand.Caleb Perl & Mark Schroeder - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1453-1471.
"Ought" and Error.Christine Tiefensee - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (2):96-114.

Add more references