Moral Obligation and Epistemic Risk

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 10:81-105 (2020)
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Author Profiles

Boris Babic
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Zoë Johnson King
Harvard University

Citations of this work

Normativity, Epistemic Rationality, and Noisy Statistical Evidence.Boris Babic, Anil Gaba, Ilia Tsetlin & Robert Winkler - 2024 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 75 (1):153-176.
Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment.Jie Gao - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
Morality Does Not Encroach.Zachary Goodsell & John Hawthorne - 2025 - In Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Knowledge and rationality: essays in honor of Stewart Cohen. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Algorithmic fairness and resentment.Boris Babic & Zoë Johnson King - 2025 - Philosophical Studies 182 (1):87-119.

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References found in this work

Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.
The theory of probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley,: University of California Press.

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