Abstract

How shall we analyze the logic of science? The Cartesian quest for absolute certainty fails. When we turn to Humean Empiricism we find the view suffering from three significant difficulties: one is a difficulty with foundations for induction, another concerns the status of theoretical entities, and the third concerns the analysis of causal relations. In Gilbert Harman's conception of induction as inference to the best explanation we find the basis for an alternative paradigm; and in this dissertation such an alternative paradigm is explored and articulated. The success of "explanationism" in treating the three difficulties argues for this approach to analyzing the logic of science. In particular, by treating certain probabilities as propensities rather than frequencies, the defects of Reichenbach's "vindication" of induction can be repaired, and the traditional problem of induction made less intransigent. ;According to the view: without absolute certainty, understanding and rationality are nevertheless possible; science is built upon the physical senses and experiments; and things-as-they-are can be known, even seen