Mind Regained [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 53 (1):193-194 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Pols addresses the mind-body problem by a creative development of the views on agency and direct knowing expressed in his earlier Meditation on a Prisoner, The Acts of Our Being, and Radical Realism. A long introductory chapter outlines four major theses of the present book. Dominant modern doctrines about knowing conceal the mind’s power to know the real directly. Dominant modern doctrines about causality—especially the received scientific doctrine of causality—hide the distinctive mode of causality the mind deploys within and upon the physical infrastructure that supports it. Reflexive attention on the part of mind to the full concreteness of its own functions—Pols calls this “attending to mind itself”—can overcome these doctrinal barriers and reveal the true causal status of mind. A rational agent is the apex being of a hierarchy of causality: although causally supported by its infrastructure, it is also causally effective in that infrastructure.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,010

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mind Regained.Edward Pols - 2019 - Cornell University Press.
Mind Regained. [REVIEW]Joseph Rychlak - 1998 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (4):451-454.
Pols, Edward. Mind Regained. [REVIEW]Alicia Juarrero - 1999 - Review of Metaphysics 53 (1):193-195.
Pols, E.-Mind Regained.R. Bonzon - 1999 - Philosophical Books 40:262-263.
Mind Regained.Edward Pols - 1998 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 61 (2):394-396.
Philosophy of Mind.[author unknown] - 2002 - Philosophical Books 40 (4):258-264.
Radical Realism. [REVIEW]Jude P. Dougherty - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):723-725.
Rational action and the complexity of causality.Edward Pols - 2002 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):1-18.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-03-18

Downloads
39 (#577,026)

6 months
9 (#485,111)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references