Abstract

Locke's contractarian theory of political obligation has been controversial, largely due to his notorious distinction between express and tacit consent. To most political philosophers it is an inconsistent theory, and to most historians it is an inappropriate response to Sir Robert Filmer's criticisms of social contract theory. The aim of this dissertation is to show that Locke's theory of political obligation is much better than generally recognized. ;My argument is based primarily on the recognition that Locke developed a theory of two different types of obligation resting on two different types of consent. I argue that for Locke the obligation incurred by express consent is owed to the commonwealth rather than the civil government. It is a member's contract-based permanent obligation to obey the laws of legitimate government, not to war against his own commonwealth and not to desert his own commonwealth when it is engaged in war, and to erect a new legislature should the current government be dissolved. ;I also argue that for Locke the obligation incurred by tacit consent is owed to the civil government rather than the commonwealth. It is a resident's non-contract-based conditional obligation to obey the laws of legitimate government. I then show that for Locke most women, servants, and visiting aliens are exclusively tacit consenters who are not eligible to become express consenters, and that the justificatory basis of their legal obligations lies in the law of nature. ;I conclude that by constructing his social contract theory on the basis of two different types of obligation, Locke successfully overcame several difficulties which the traditional social contract theories faced. In particular, because he regarded the state of nature and the original contract as purely rational reconstructions, and because of his ingenious view of inheritance as an incentive for future generations to give their express consent to membership in the commonwealth, he was able to respond effectively to Filmer's criticisms