Abstract

The dissertation addresses the relationship between common sense, skepticism, and naturalistic science in Hume. It is argued that Hume's moral science uncovers numerous common illusions of visual and moral perception; it is not a defense of common-sense experience. ;Firstly, Hume views the ordinary experience of causation and external reality as illusory. The former experience is a projection of human expectation; the latter a conflation of perceptions. ;Secondly, it is argued that, according to Hume, the moral judge overlooks his biases by fictively projecting himself to an impartial standpoint. Impartial sentiments are weak, however, and their weakness generates another fiction: they are mistaken for the inferences of reason. Finally, the judge falsely imagines that he can "see" the character of the persons whom he judges, when all that he actually sees are their actions. ;Thirdly, the dissertation contends that, although the practice of justice arises out of self-interest, the moral agent mistakes his personal interest for public benevolence. When his hidden selfishness fails to move him, he acts justly in the hope of re-acquiring the "lost" benevolence that he never actually had. He saves himself from disappointment by misinterpreting his actions as signs of genuine reform. In the case of promising, the agent falsely imagines that he wills its moral obligation into being with the words "I promise." ;Fourthly, it is shown how Hume denies that we can find the historical root of political obedience in enlightened self-interest and instead stresses the founding role of usurpation and conquest, erased from memory by the passage of time and the efficacy of present government. ;Finally, we see that the appearance of virtue and vice is the illusory correlate of our sentiments: we project sentiments of approval and disapproval onto others and then mistake them for objective traits. ;Contrary to what some interpreters have asserted, I conclude that, according to Hume, the philosopher is never cured of his profound skepticism. Skepticism recurs as long as the philosopher philosophizes. This is problematic, however, because at its most radical, skepticism is incompatible with moral science