Moral fictionalism, the Frege-Geach problem, and reasonable inference

Analysis 68 (2):133-143 (2008)
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Abstract

CHANGE SLIDE Go through outline of talk CHANGE SLIDE It is my sincerest hope that if there is one thing that people take away from Moral Fictionalism, it is the recognition that standard noncognitivism involves a syndrome of three, logically distinct claims. Standard noncognitivists claim that moral judgment is not belief or any other cognitive attitude but is, rather, a noncognitive attitude more akin to desire; that this noncognitive attitude is expressed by our public moral utterances; and, hence, that our public moral utterances lack a distinctively moral subject matter and so are not answerable to the moral facts. Notice, however, that these are logically distinct claimsthe rst is a psychological claim, the second and third, positive and negative semantic claims, respectively. We can regiment the familiar technical vocabulary as follow: CHANGE..

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Mark Eli Kalderon
University College London

Citations of this work

Projection and Pretence in Ethics.Edmund Dain - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):181-208.

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What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Language, truth and logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London,: V. Gollancz.

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