Parousia, Sympathy and Sensory Presentation

Abstract

I give an account of sensory presentation, an indispensable and irreducible element of perceptual experience, in terms of the principle of sympathy. Haptic touch, audition, and vision are compared.

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References found in this work

The Structure of Behavior.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1963 - Boston,: Beacon Press (MA).
The limits of self-awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
Setting things before the mind.Michael G. F. Martin - 1998 - In Anthony O'Hear, Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 157--179.
On a neglected epistemic virtue.Mark Johnston - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):165-218.

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