경험주의적 현실성과 합리주의적 현실성 칸트와 헤겔의 경우

Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 16:411-420 (2008)
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Abstract

What is actual being? The empiricist answers that only what is given to sensation is actual. The rationalist answers that the given to sensation is not actual being but the reasonable connection of the world is a genuine actuality. Kant shows his commitment to empiricism by arguing that only the given to sensation exists.Sensation as an ultimate criterion for actuality is the base of Kant’s critique of the traditional metaphysics. If sensation is proved to be problematic as a criterion for actuality, Kant’s empirical critique of the traditional metaphysics is undermined. This paper will show that in criticizing Kant’s critique of the traditional metaphysics, we can not do so on the basis of an empirical distinction between dream and actuality. On the basis of Hegel’s explanation of the rational actuality,I will show further that the criterion for distinction between dream and actuality is the reasonable connection of the states of affairs.

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