Abstract

Could Externalism and Individualism be combined to produce a "hybrid" theory of the Mind? In such hybrid theory one is Individualist about certain aspects of the Mental while being Externalist about others. Specifically: Could one be Externalist about individuation of the intentional content of a mental state while being Individualist about the individuation of the mental state? Could one be Individualist about the individuation of the intentional content of a mental state while being Externalist about the individuation of the mental state? Assuming Tyler Burge's brand of Externalism about individuation of intentional content of a mental state, it appears that one may answer in the affirmative with regard to query above. One must, however, dispense with the idea that intentional content of a mental state is an essential property of the mental state. Frances Egan points out that a seriously computational Representational Theory of Mind may be committed to relinquishing the notion that intentional content of a mental state is an essential property of the mental state Regarding query , assuming John McDowell's brand of Externalism about individuation of a mental state, it seems there is no choice but to respond in the negative. Within the constraints of McDowell's doctrines it seems difficult to get rid of the thought that intentional content of a mental state is an essential property of the mental state and thus the prospects for hybrid theory of the sort envisaged in above seem dim