How do Persons With Dementia Suffer?

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics:1-8 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This essay argues that suffering in persons with dementia is more than a matter of personal experience. It is knowable by others and does not need to rely on the reports of the patient to affirm it. It is even possible for a person to claim not to be suffering—“I’m doing fine”—but for others to conclude to the contrary—“You are suffering.” A key property of this objective account is the caregiver observes the suffering. This observation is a product of the work of caregiving and this work relies on perceiving and supporting the mind of the person living with dementia. When that work of mind support is successful, it creates a feeling of being at home. When it is not, suffering ensues.

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The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.

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