Philosophical Realism: The Challenges for Social Epistemologists

Social Epistemology 29 (4):431-444 (2015)
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Abstract

Social epistemology assumes a justification as a realist philosophy in both dealing with cognitive and ontological matters, and providing a profound and refined picture of knowledge and reality. Compared to scientific realism, social epistemology’s advantage consists of grasping the variety of conditions and circumstances influencing the cognitive process. Social epistemology also provides limitations for naturalism in offering a genuine philosophical vision of knowledge and reality. From a social epistemological perspective, extreme forms of defending scientific realism are considered especially relevant as such arguments reveal the ideological ladeness of objectivist argumentation

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Citations of this work

Gift versus Trade: On the Culture of Science Communication.Ilya Kasavin - 2019 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49 (6):453-472.

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References found in this work

Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to the Actor-Network Theory.Bruno Latour - 2005 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Natural kinds and biological taxa.John Dupré - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (1):66-90.
Plato on knowledge and forms: selected essays.Gail Fine - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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