How (Not) to Explain Deontic Status by Good Reasoning: A Reply to Ulf Hlobil

Erkenntnis:1-7 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In a recent paper in this journal, Ulf Hlobil has argued for an account of deontic notions in terms of good reasoning. He suggests that we should first explain permissibility in terms of good practical inference and we can then explain other deontic notions based on it. I argue that this specific way of explaining deontic notions by good reasoning is unmotivated and also leads to implausible consequences. I also show that if we instead start by explaining obligation in terms of good reasoning and then explain other deontic notions based on it, these problems vanish.

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2024-11-07

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Alireza Kazemi
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences

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