Abstract

Cartesian philosophy presupposes the legitimacy of body-mind dualism, subject-object dualism, the principle of "clear and distinct ideas," and the human individual as an "autonomous agent." In contrast, the philosophical projects of James, Merleau-Ponty, and Nishida are all characterized by a critical stance taken toward these Cartesian presuppositions. That is, first, the "body" is established as the ground for our pre-reflexive yet active communion with the world. Second, the intertwining inseparability of "object-knowledge" and "self-knowledge" in our being in the world is acknowledged. Third, the phenomenon of "horizon" is thematized as an indispensable moment in the constitution of "experience." Finally, the "self" is understood as being embedded in and supported by the "field of experience." With this in mind, we can appreciate Whitehead's comparison of James' "Does Consciousness Exist?" with Descartes' Discourse on Method as the "inauguration of a new stage of philosophy." In this context the significance of Nishida's notion of "the world as the self's body" can be productively discussed.