Against Leben’s Rawlsian Collision Algorithm for Autonomous Vehicles

In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017. Berlin: Springer. pp. 259-272 (2017)
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Abstract

Suppose that an autonomous vehicle encounters a situation where (i) imposing a risk of harm on at least one person is unavoidable; and (ii) a choice about how to allocate risks of harm between different persons is required. What does morality require in these cases? Derek Leben defends a Rawlsian answer to this question. I argue that we have reason to reject Leben’s answer.

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Geoff Keeling
Stanford University

References found in this work

Justice as fairness: a restatement.John Rawls (ed.) - 2001 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The idea of justice.Amartya Sen - 2009 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives.Alastair Norcross - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (2):135-167.
A Rawlsian algorithm for autonomous vehicles.Derek Leben - 2017 - Ethics and Information Technology 19 (2):107-115.
Justifiability to each person.Derek Parfit - 2003 - Ratio 16 (4):368–390.

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