Vulnerability, Conscience, and Integrity

De Ethica 8 (1):10-24 (2024)
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Abstract

This essay explores how vulnerability, understood not as precarity but as capacious responsiveness, much as the Philosopher Judith Butler identifies it, and recognition are key moral concepts that are prior conditions for the expression of conscience. Appreciating Thomas Aquinas' argument that conscience is neither a power or a habit, but rather an act, the essay argues that Aquinas' inclination synderesis, that prompts us to the good and away from evil, functions in a way similar to vulnerability. Fundamentally, vulnerability prompts us to recognize the neighbor who needs our response.

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2024-05-15

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Precarious Life, Vulnerability, and the Ethics of Cohabitation.Judith Butler - 2012 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26 (2):134-151.
Vulnerable to Contingency.James F. Keenan - 2020 - Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 40 (2):221-236.

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