Why Realists Need Tropes

Metaphysica 17 (1):69-85 (2016)
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Abstract

We argue that if one wishes to be a realist, one should adopt a Neo-Aristotelian ontology involving tropes instead of a Russellian ontology of property universals and objects. Either Russellian realists should adopt the relata-specific relational tropes of instantiation instead of facts, or convert to Neo-Aristotelian realism with monadic tropes. Regarding Neo-Aristotelian realism, we have two novel points why it fares better than Russellian realism. Instantiation of property universals by tropes and characterization or inherence between tropes and objects are more transparent ontological notions than relational inherence, which is assumed in Russellian realism with the relational tropes of instantiation. Neo-Aristotelian realism makes better sense about abstract universals, which are a more viable option than concrete universals.

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Author Profiles

Antti Keskinen
Tampere University
Jani Hakkarainen
Tampere University
Markku Keinänen
Tampere University

References found in this work

Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Scientific Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Truth and truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time.E. J. Lowe - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

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