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Accuracy and infinity: a dilemma for subjective Bayesians
Synthese 201 (12):1-14 (2023)
Abstract
We argue that subjective Bayesians face a dilemma: they must offend against the spirit of their permissivism about rational credence or reject the principle that one should avoid accuracy dominance.Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
Better Foundations for Subjective Probability.Sven Neth - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
References found in this work
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.
Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.
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