Abstract

Madison's powerful brand of liberalism would construct political institutions so that politics might work in spite of perceived deficiencies of human nature. A different way of conceiving of political action highlights the idea of virtue--and corresponding categories of need, function, and capacity. Alasdair MacIntyre focussed attention on this alternative in his 1981 book, After Virtue. This dissertation analyzes MacIntyre's neo-Aristotelian teleological ethics. It develops a critical account of MacIntyre's moral and political argument, pointing toward a revision of one political alternative. ;We cannot understand the political implications of MacIntyre's theory, however, until we recognize its underlying Christian character. Although at various points in his argument MacIntyre offers culture, biology, narrative unity, and theology as the foundation of moral action, Christianity provides what MacIntyre requires of morality: a basis from which to criticize existing society, choose between rival moralities, and issue right action. Christianity provides a moral criterion that is impersonal and universal in character and an objective foundation for the human telos. ;MacIntyre leaves open, however, the kind of Christianity that informs his political view. The certainty drawn from role and station and the faith of a quest for the good correspond to Catholic and Protestant tendencies in MacIntyre's thought. Emphasizing core elements of Christian theology such as moral authoritarianism and the primacy of individual conscience, these competing views see the relationship between virtues and political institutions differently. Although both oppose Madison's proceduralism, MacIntyre's Catholic institutions would instill virtue, while his Protestant institutions would simply provide the conditions for virtue. ;As MacIntyre develops his argument, he increasingly commits to his theocratic idea. MacIntyre is led down this path because he mistakenly believes that knowledge of objective truth must move people to subjective certainty. MacIntyre attempts to transmit the feeling of certainty to people through determinate roles and practices that move them beyond choice. But as MacIntyre's Protestant politics suggest, moral objectivity does not require political certainty. ;Although human knowledge is limited, nonetheless we can devise a partial ordering of the objective good. Within this voluntarist politics, the development of man's highest capacities provides a new justificatory framework for public policy