Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the philosophy of Karl Marx. Freedom and necessity have co-equal central importance and form the conceptual basis of this philosophy. ;Understanding Marx's philosophy is fraught with difficulties, the most significant of which is that he himself did not anywhere present anything that remotely resembles a philosophy in systematic form. Hence, the only way to grasp a philosophy in Marx is to submit his ideas to a hermeneutical examination. One must look underneath the surface of many non-philosophical statements in order to discern the philosophical presuppositions which determine their real meaning. Philosophical concepts, however, must not be confused with non-philosophical concepts. ;The concepts of freedom and necessity lie at the root of Marx's philosophy as the presuppositions of it. In the history of philosophy these two concepts are generally regarded as antithetical. It will be necessary to show that for Marx these concepts are not antithetical, but reciprocal. Instead of cancelling one another they mutually require each other. They are, therefore, dialectically related. ;By concentrating on this point this study will demonstrate that there is a systematic philosophy in Marx although there appeared to be none. Moreover, it will show how Marx's philosophy, though hidden, nevertheless predetermines his thinking when it embraces his economic, social, or political ideas. ;With regard to method this dissertation proceeds in two ways. Part II provides a historico-philosophical exposition in order to show the philosophical context from which Marx's thinking arises. It will be argued that the themes of freedom and necessity are issues in existence prior to Marx and therefore do not begin de novo with him. However, Marx will show his own unique formulation of them; i.e., his own transformation of their meaning to fit his materialist outlook. Accordingly, Marx's connection to Hegel, in the narrower sense, and his relation to the German Idealist tradition starting with Kant, in the broader sense, will entail a structural explanation thus far not provided. As a consequence both Marx's continuity and discontinuity with a tradition dominated by the problem of freedom versus necessity will be better understood. . . . UMI