Degree of factual support

Philosophy of Science 19 (4):307-324 (1952)
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Abstract

We wish to give a precise formulation of the intuitive concept: The degree to which the known facts support a given hypothesis.

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reprint Kemeny, John G.; Oppenheim, Paul (1955) "Degree of Factual Support". Journal of Symbolic Logic 20(2):190-190

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Citations of this work

Studies in the logic of explanation.Carl Gustav Hempel & Paul Oppenheim - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (2):135-175.
Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.Paul Oppenheim & Hilary Putnam - 1958 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:3-36.
Conceptual engineering, truth, and efficacy.Jennifer Nado - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1507-1527.
The Logic of Explanatory Power.Jonah N. Schupbach & Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (1):105-127.

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