Quine Versus Davidson: Truth, Reference, and Meaning

Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press (2012)
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Abstract

Gary Kemp presents a penetrating investigation of key issues in the philosophy of language, by means of a comparative study of two great figures of late twentieth-century philosophy. He reveals unexplored tensions between the views of Quine and Davidson, and presents a powerful argument in favour of Quine and methodological naturalism.

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2012-04-15

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Gary Kemp
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Davidson’s Wittgenstein.Ali Hossein Khani - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (5):1-26.
Quine’s conflicts with truth deflationism.Teemu Tauriainen - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (46):1-25.
Peter Winch and the Autonomy of the Social Sciences.Jonas Ahlskog - 2022 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 52 (3):150-174.

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