Concepts, Brains, and Behaviour

Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):105-113 (2010)
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Abstract

Concepts are best understood as a particular kind of human ability: a person who has mastered the use of a word for F in some language possesses the concept of F. Abilities are individuated by their possessors and their exercises, though they are not to be identified with either. Typically abilities are associated with vehicles, that is to say underlying actualities which account for their exercises. The mind is the human ability to form concepts, and its principal vehicle is the brain; but the mind should not be identified with the brain any more than it should be identified with the behaviour in which its concepts are expressed

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Anthony Kenny
Oxford University

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