Familiarity inferences, subjective attitudes and counterstance contingency: towards a pragmatic theory of subjective meaning

Linguistics and Philosophy 45 (6):1395-1445 (2022)
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Abstract

Subjective predicates have two interpretive and distributional characteristics that have resisted a comprehensive analysis. First, the use of a subjective predicate to describe an object is in general felicitous only when the speaker has a particular kind of familiarity with relevant features of the object; characterizing an object as _tasty,_ for example, implies that the speaker has experience of its taste. Second, subjective predicates differ from objective predicates in their distribution under certain types of propositional attitude verbs. The goal of this paper is to argue that these features can be explained in a uniform way and within a broadly truth-conditional approach to semantic content, given a view of subjective language as an essentially pragmatic, context-sensitive phenomenon. Specifically, we propose that what renders an issue subjective in discourse is speakers’ awareness of _counterstance contingency_: contingency relative to information states that represent alternative pragmatic stances.

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Malte Willer
University of Chicago

Citations of this work

Judging for ourselves.Justin Khoo - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
The Presumption of Realism.Nils Franzén - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5).

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Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein, Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.

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