Abstract

Our worldview assumes that people are morally responsible. Consider our emotions regarding other people or ourselves. We often feel anger, gratitude, pride, and shame toward them or ourselves. Consider religious beliefs. Jews and Christians believe that God cares whether a person does right by others and freely loves him. Consider moral values. We value dignity, freedom, and rights. The above emotions, beliefs, and values assume that people are responsible. In particular, they assume that a person is responsible for what she thinks and does, and that this is a good thing. This book argues that the above worldview is false. No one is responsible. I provide four arguments for this conclusion. (1) Foundation. No one is responsible because there is no foundation for responsibility. A foundation for responsibility is something for which a person is responsible but not by being responsible for something else. (2) Epistemic Condition. No one is responsible because no one fulfills the epistemic condition necessary for blameworthiness. (3) Internalism. If a person were responsible, then she would be responsible for, and only for, what goes on in her head. Most of the evidence for responsibility says the opposite. (4) Amount. No one is responsible because we cannot make sense of what makes a person more or less praiseworthy (or blameworthy). The above arguments cohere with each other, explain the responsibility-skepticism literature, and have disturbing implications.