Abstract

This work is an attempt to seek conceptual clarity concerning some entities of our common external world. As we proceed, it turns into an occasion to see how Language, Thought and Reality are mutually related in these contexts. ;The statements of our world assert something, directly or indirectly, concerning its concrete particulars, which alone fill the world. A linguistic expression may pick out a part or an aspect of a concrete situation. We entitize existents which are non-entities e.g. relations and universals, and even non-existents. The way our thought developed, sometimes, makes us feel more comfortable with what is more abstract. ;I postulate 'the ideal world' as a domain of all thinkables or possibilities of thought with objective but unreal entities and relations. We will be concerned with reality only so far as it is thinkable, and our thought cannot go beyond the ideal world. Within this range entities differ in degrees of reality and concretivity. ;We can see our world and its concrete particulars in their mode of being i.e., as they are at a time with their relations and abstract aspects, or in their mode of becoming i.e., as they change or apparently remain unchanged with them over a length of time. ;The understanding of the mode of becoming of our world and subsequently the understanding of change and changing things become difficult due to the habit of mind which sees things as having the whole of their being at every point of time during their existence. ;The full concretivity of things involves their temporal extension. ;Our statements about the world, which concern the relations between some entities, may be about their mode of being or mode of becoming. In the latter case they may describe events, just as in the former case they describe states of affairs. ;We see our concrete particulars as things when we are more concerned with their mode of being, and see them as events when we are more concerned with their mode of becoming. ;This is seeing things and events concretely and is in conformity with our common usage of 'things' and 'events'