Abstract

G. E. M. Anscombe introduced the concept of »practical knowledge« into contemporary action theory. According to Anscombe, in cases where someone’s action fails to be performed successfully, the error lies in what he or she is doing and not in what he or she is thinking, wherefore his thought is not mistaken, and thus still knowledge. But Anscombe also seems to believe that knowledge is factive, i.e. to know that p implies that p. Both claims are, however, in tension with each other, because my practical mistake prevents that my knowledge corresponds to a fact. This paper seeks to address the problem this tension poses for our understanding of practical knowledge. In § 1, I describe the problem. In § 2, I review Anscombe’s own response to the problem, and point out a difficulty for it. In § 3, I discuss three other attempts to deal with the problem, and argue that they are flawed. Finally, in § 4 I sketch my own solution.