Finite-Length Timelike Paths and Kalām Cosmological Argument

Sophia 61 (2):303-307 (2022)
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Abstract

Suppose one accepts the argument that past infinity is not acceptable. This does not eliminate the possibility that the beginning of time is not equivalent across objects. Along with breakdown of absolute simultaneity of events in relativity, there may even be no agreement on whether an event existed. There may be no consistent way to totally order events. In such a case, despite every object, conscious or not, having finite lifetime, there may be no single point called “the beginning,” and the universe stays as it is without requiring a cause of existence.

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Divine timelessness and personhood.William Lane Craig - 1998 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43 (2):109-124.

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