Kripke’s Theory of Truth and the Liar Paradox

Korean Journal of Logic 7 (1):67-83 (2004)
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to defend Kripke's theory of truth from Simmons' objection. First, after introducing various sorts of the liar paradox, briefly I explain Tarski's attempt to solve the puzzle. Then, I outline Kripke's solution by using the concept of 'fixed point'. Simmons offers an interesting objection against Kripke's solution. He uses a diagonal argument in his attack to Kripke's idea. I claim that Simmons seem to use 'exclusion negation' in refuting Kripke. I think, however, there is an alternative interpretation, which is 'choice negation'. With using choice negation, I maintain that Kripke's theory of truth can be defended from Simmons' objection.

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