Reduction, Correspondence and Identity

The Monist 52 (3):424-438 (1968)
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Abstract

Is social science ‘reducible’ to individual psychology, and ultimately to some physical theory? If a sociological theory, that is, a theory dealing with group phenomena, is ‘reduced’ in a relevant and appropriate sense to individual psychology, could we then say that the social phenomena in the domain of the sociological theory are just psychological phenomena of individuals? Conversely, if social events and processes are just individual psychological events and processes, then does it follow that any theory dealing with the former is ‘reducible’ to some theory dealing with the latter? Analogously, if psychological theory is ‘reducible’ to physical theory, say the neurological theory of the brain and the associated organs, could we say that psychological phenomena are just neurological phenomena in the brain? What of the converse of this question? Further, what is the bearing on these questions of the thesis that there are laws correlating types of social phenomena with types of individual psychological phenomena, or types of psychological phenomena with types of neurological phenomena?

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Author's Profile

Jaegwon Kim
Last affiliation: Brown University

Citations of this work

Science without reduction.Helmut F. Spinner - 1973 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 16 (1-4):16 – 94.
Explanation; what's it all about?John James Economos - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):139 – 145.

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