Abstract

ABELARD'S ethical theory, presented above all in his Ethics, is a version of what I'll call intentionalism': the view that the agent's intention determines the moral worth of an action. Now even in Abelard's day, the common understanding of morality seemed to endorse the following principle: (P) An agent should intend to Φ only if bringing about Φ would be good But Abelard replaces (P) with its obverse, a principle he identifies as the rational core imbedded in traditional Christian moral teaching: (P*) An agent should bring about Φ only if intending to Φ would be good Abelard's arguments against (P) and in support of (P*) are remarkably similar to those given by the most famous exponent of intentionalism, Kant. For Kant's ethical theory, especially as he presents in the first section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, identifies (P*) as the philosophical conception corresponding to the "common rational knowledge of morals." Abelard and Kant locate moral worth in features of the way the agent conceptualizes her performances, and each thinks that goodness is characterizable in terms of the form such conceptualization takes. Both are deeply indebted to Stoic ethics, familiar to each largely through Seneca's letters, and they share a common project: 'christianizing' Stoic metaethics so that the classical equation of virtue with happiness is revised to leave room for God and the Afterlife. I'l l proceed as follows. In §1, Abelard's arguments against (P) will be canvassed. In §2, I'l l look at his arguments in favor of (P*) and a 'mediaeval categorical imperative'. In §3, a comparison with Kant's intentionalism should make the virtues of Abelard's theory apparent. In §4, I'l l discuss Abelard's failed attempt to baptize Stoicism. Finally, by way of conclusion, I'll offer a suggestion about why intentionalism, in any of its versions, is an ethical theory to take seriously.