Davidson and the Refutation of Idealism

Idealistic Studies 16 (2):113-123 (1986)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

G. E. Moore’s famous “Refutation of Idealism” and related essays, like “Hume’s Philosophy” in his Philosophical Studies, signaled the rise of a passionate belief. That is, we cannot use less obviously lucid and acceptable claims or arguments to defeat propositions that are most clear and most obviously true by our plainest human standards. The plurality of material objects in material space is assured for us by the high degree of clarity and assuredness of our propositions about hands, trees, meals, clocks, clouds, and rainfall. The soundness of belief in matter, time, space, and the plurality of material objects is upheld by such ordinary and obviously true propositions about the familiar. And the massive number of such commonsensical propositions makes the task of idealists and skeptics supremely unpromising.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,459

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Common Sense Propositions.A. C. Ewing - 1973 - Philosophy 48 (186):363 - 379.
Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer.
Time for Hume’s Unchanging Objects.Miren Boehm & Maité Cruz - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (16).
XIV.—Propositions about Material Objects.R. B. Braithwaite - 1938 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 38 (1):269-290.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
43 (#524,466)

6 months
9 (#511,775)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references