Abstract

For the greater part of this century Hegel was largely ignored by philosophers—and historians of philosophy—from the analytic tradition. No doubt many factors have shaped Hegel’s reception, but chief among them is the very origin of the analytic tradition. When Russell and Moore rebelled against the philosophical orthodoxy of their day and began the analytic movement, they argued against two Idealist doctrines: the doctrine of internal relations and the radical holistic claim that no part of the universe can be understood on its own. The British Idealists, of course, claimed Hegel as the source and inspiration of these ideas, and Russell and Moore never doubted the veracity of their interpretation. From that point on, the analytic tradition thought of Hegel as a philosopher whose main doctrines had been demolished long ago by Russell and Moore. I want to argue in this paper that Hegel’s reception has been predicated on a mistake. Russell and Moore were wrong—not in their criticisms of the British Idealists but in their interpretation of Hegel, who advocated neither the standard internal relations doctrine nor a radical holism. The real views of Hegel, it seems to me, are largely immune to the criticisms of Russell and Moore.