Abstract

In Metaphysics Book Z, chapter eight, Aristotle seems to say that Callias and Socrates are compounds of matter and form—compounds that have the same form but are individuated by their matter. Stipulate that the material elements that compose Callias are redistributed to serve as the material elements of Socrates, and that Callias and Socrates share the same form, i.e., that of being a human. In addition, let it be assumed that any material thing is identical to its form and its matter. If it is impossible for Socrates and Callias to be identical, there is a problem. Ex hypothesi, Socrates and Callias have, albeit at different times, the same matter. Less controversially they have the same form. As it has been assumed that that which has the same form and the same matter is the same thing, Socrates and Callias will, and of course will not, so runs the reductio ad absurdum, be identical. The above difficulty has been raised for Aristotle’s metaphysics by Kit Fine. Following Fine’s terminology, I call it “The Puzzle of Simple Composition” (PSC). I reconstruct an answer on Aristotle’s behalf that rests upon an appreciation of the status of living organisms and their persistence conditions