Abstract

In this article I briefly discuss two problems of ontology of states of affairs: the issue of negative states of affairs and the so-called slingshot argument. In particular, I consider several objections against negative states of affairs, including this one: if one accepts the existence of negative states of affairs, why not accept the existence of conjunctive states of affairs (or, alternatively, Shefferian ones, or even binegative ones), which results, it seems, in the acceptance of the existence of states of affairs of any logical form. I argue that regardless of this doubt, at least some negative sentences have (non-trivial) ontological correlates. As for the slingshot argument, I argue that it is not the implicated Principle of Extensionality that is at fault, but the principle of the identity of the correlates of logically equivalent sentences (often called ‘Wittgenstein’s Principle’), which is simply false since ‘2+2=4’ and ‘8-5=3’ are just logically equivalent.