A Proof‐Theoretic Account of the Miners Paradox

Theoria 82 (4):351-369 (2016)
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Abstract

By maintaining that a conditional sentence can be taken to express the validity of a rule of inference, we offer a solution to the Miners Paradox that leaves both modus ponens and disjunction elimination intact. The solution draws on Sundholm's recently proposed account of Fitch's Paradox.

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10.1111/theo.12090

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Ansten Klev
Czech Academy of Sciences

Citations of this work

Iterated team semantics for a hierarchy of informational types.Vít Punčochář - 2022 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 173 (10):103156.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
Defaults in update semantics.Frank Veltman - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):221 - 261.

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