Propositions and truth in natural languages

Mind 81 (322):225-243 (1972)
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10.1093/mind/lxxxi.322.225

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Citations of this work

The liar paradox.Charles Parsons - 1974 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):381 - 412.
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