Abstract

The importance of this finding may be measured in terms of the implications it has for a theory of freedom. Within the expanded context, the problem of freedom becomes, in part, the problem of inquiry. "What can I do?" is an ellipsis for "What can I knowingly do?" The problem of freedom is discarded to be replaced by two mutually complementing notions: the problem of freedom and the problem of freedom. "What can I do?" is found to have an initiative sense which can be seen as an instantiation of the problem of freedom and an achievement sense which can be seen as an instantiation of the problem of freedom. The initiative sense of "What can I do?" can be used to underwrite freedom as a measure of an individual's versatility, the achievement sense to underwrite freedom as a measure of an individual's limits. The initiative and achievement senses of "What can I do?" lend themselves to unpacking, respectively, in terms of freedom of... and freedom to--. Both freedoms are found to be consonant with and required for an understanding of science as a knowledge-seeking and knowledge-yielding enterprise, our notions of institutional laws and norms, and our intuitions about the nature of man. Freedoms to-- are found to conflict and, in some cases, turn out to be either self-limiting or self-destructive. Freedoms of... are none of these. Freedoms to-- are as numerous as there are verbs of action. We were able to identify only one freedom of... which fits into our scheme of things, freedom of inquiry. ;We engage the problem of freedom in a context in which the behaviour of an individual, J, is to be examined by an inquirer, S, in terms of questions such as "Could J have done otherwise?" and "What can J do?" We learn that neither question can be answered decisively but that the weight of received wisdom is behind "No!" to the first question and "Not anything!" to the second. This context may be expanded to take in the inquirer, by the inquirer taking "What can J do?" and, instantiating with respect to "J", arriving at "What can I do?" We learn now that "What can I do?" is answered decisively by "I can ask a question. I can inquire. I can do something." The difference between the subjects of these two contexts is the difference between an individual to whom no doing need be attributed and an individual to whom some doing must be attributed. ;What can we learn about freedom from an examination of the problem of freedom? That depends, of course, on what is recognized as the problem of freedom and on what conception of problem it is based. Received wisdom instructs us to equate the problem of freedom with the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We challenge received wisdom in its stating the problem of freedom as a proposition. We examine the notion of a problem in the light of certain discernible, logical properties of known problems and find that the problem of freedom fails to meet any of the ascertainable criteria of problemhood. We arugue for a sense of "problem" that makes a problem the equivalent of a question, or set of questions, the pursuit of which leads to a solution