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Theory of mind and moral cognition: Exploring the connections
Trends in Cognitive Science 9 (8):357-359 (2005)
Abstract
An extremely brief (3 page) review of recent work on the ways in which people's moral judgments can influence their use of folk-psychological conceptsAuthor's Profile
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Moral cognition and theory of mind: Exploring the connections.J. Knobe - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9:357-359.
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Judgments of moral responsibility: a unified account.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - In Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (eds.), The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility. Blackwell. pp. 1–10.
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Citations of this work
Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence, and the future.John Mikhail - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):143 –152.
The past and future of experimental philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.
Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment.Jonathan D. Cohen Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144.
Intuitions about consciousness: Experimental studies.Joshua Knobe & Jesse Prinz - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):67-83.
Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect: 'Theory of mind' and moral judgment.Joshua Knobe, Adam Cohen & Alan Leslie - 2006 - Psychological Science 17:421-427.
References found in this work
The concept of intentional action: A case study in the uses of folk psychology.Joshua Knobe - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.
Intentional action in ordinary language: core concept or pragmatic understanding?Fred Adams & Annie Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):173-181.
On praise, side effects, and folk ascriptions of intentionality.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):196-213.
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