The Philosopher’s Projective Error

Philosophical Studies 132 (3):581-593 (2007)
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Abstract

This paper is a discussion of Michael Thau's interesting critique in Chapter 2 of Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, of the common view that beliefs are internal states.

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The Philosopher’s Projective Error.Bernard W. Kobes - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):581-593.
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Bernard Kobes
Arizona State University

Citations of this work

Appearance properties?Andy Egan - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3):495-521.
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