Guilt – Forgiveness – Reconciliation – and Recognition in Armed Conflict

Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 64 (6):74-91 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper argues that in our usage of moral language we relate three concepts: guilt, forgiveness, and reconciliation. This assumes that we can distinguish between external actions and internal executions, because guilt as well as forgiveness and reconciliation are realities that first affect our inner humanity. When a relationship has been damaged by culpable actions (sometimes even by both sides), forgiveness is the precondition of reconciliation. As long as people accuse each other, there can be no talk of true reconciliation. Although these are attitudes, that is, inner engagements, reconciliation also becomes outwardly recognizable as peace. However, these relationships can only be explained well in the connections of individual persons to each other. When political communities confront each other, our moral sense becomes fuzzy, because it is not so easy to say how such collectives (e.g., peoples) are to be determined in their inside and outside. Who can and may forgive, if other persons have become victims of culpable actions, but cannot forgive themselves? Here, then, the difficulty of individuality and collectivity is added. The essay pleads for maintaining the conceptual conjunction between individual and collective forgiveness. However, this should not be done at the price of a complete socio-ontological dissolution of collectives. Therefore, one must also be cautious about rash universalistic appropriation of the Other or the other group, because this is usually accompanied by a failure to recognize and endure the selfhood of the Other. Before it comes to a “false” reconciliation in this way, it is better to at least recognize each other – also in diversity. This should also be reflected in the rules of conflict, which must above all be oriented toward ensuring that conflicts are not carried out in such a way that the manner in which the conflict is carried out makes reconciliation impossible. But in both collective and individual reconciliation, the person does not have the outcome of the process entirely in his or her own hands. Reconciliation is not a technique, but a relational event that is carried out in an “open space.”

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,497

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-04-09

Downloads
16 (#1,180,157)

6 months
7 (#669,170)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Anger and Reconciliation.Bernhard Koch - 2023 - Conatus 8 (2):279-298.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Superseding historic injustice.Jeremy Waldron - 1992 - Ethics 103 (1):4-28.
On the Genealogy of Morality.Friedrich Nietzsche, Keith Ansell-Pearson & Carol Diethe - 1995 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 9:192-192.

Add more references