Aims as reasons

In R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar & Samuel Freeman, Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon. , US: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 43-78 (2011)
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Niko Kolodny
University of California, Berkeley

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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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References found in this work

Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Can Desires Provide Reasons for Action.Ruth Chang - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith, Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Clarendon Press. pp. 56--90.
Practical reasoning.John Broome - 2002 - In José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar, Reason and nature: essays in the theory of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 85–111.
Reasons for Belief.Hannah Ginsborg - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286 - 318.

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