On Tolerance and Intolerance

Filozofia 66 (4):301-314 (2011)
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Abstract

The paper deals with tolerance and intolerance on the background of the tensions existing between the moral “No” and “Yes”, between the initial rejection of the values, beliefs of the others and respecting them. An indifferent tolerance of the people incapable of saying moral “Yes” or “No” is unveiled as an attitude emptied of spiritual and moral contents. It also shows the dilemmas of morally convinced people when facing the normative request to tolerate the values and beliefs of the others. The conflict between “Yes” and “No” becomes the most burning if one’s moral belief is grounded in the existence of independent moral truths. In the light of Nietzsche’s critique of tolerance as “an incapability of Yes and No” the author asks the question, whether respecting moral truths is compatible with tolerating deviations which would go beyond the benevolent attitude of the believers to those morally confused.

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