A Solution to the Raven Paradox: A Redefinition of the Notion of Instance

Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (1):99-109 (2017)
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Abstract

In this paper, I critically analyse two strands of Bayesian solution to the paradox: the standard Bayesian solution and the attempts to refute Nicod’s criterion. I argue that the standard Bayesian solution evades the exact challenge of the paradox. I hold that though the NC or instance confirmation is imprecisely formulated, it cannot be ruled out as an invalid form of confirmation. I formulate three conditions of instance confirmation which sufficiently captures our intuitive notion of instance confirmation. Finally on the basis of the conditions of instance confirmation, I show that paradoxical contrapositive instances like white shoe are not contrapositive instances of the raven hypothesis.

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References found in this work

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Philosophy 31 (118):268-269.
The paradox of confirmation.I. J. Good - 1961 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12 (45):63-64.

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