Detecting extrasolar planets

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):224-236 (2006)
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Abstract

The detection of extrasolar planets presents a good case in which to clarify the distinction between observation and inference from evidence. By asking whether these planets have been observed or inferred from evidence, and by using the scientific details to answer the question, we will get a clearer understanding of the epistemic difference between these two forms of information. The issue of scientific realism pivots on this distinction, and the results of this case will help to articulate the epistemically important factors in assessing theoretical claims.Keywords: Planetary systems; Scientific realism; Observation; Scientific method.

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References found in this work

The concept of observation in science and philosophy.Dudley Shapere - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (4):485-525.
Thick Epistemic Access.Jody Azzouni - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (9):472-484.
Theory, observation and scientific realism.Jody Azzouni - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):371-392.

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