Legal Realism and Legal Interpretivism

Abstract

Two new legal philosophies took shape in the 20th century, legal realism and legal interpretivism. Legal realists are skeptical of law and the legal reasoning done in courts. Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy, legal interpretivism, views legal reasoning as part of the coherent narrative that justifies the role of law in society. The realist movement is often traced to the philosophy of Oliver Wendel Holmes, Jr., whose thinking bears similarities to that of Friedrich Nietzsche. Taking Jerome Frank’s philosophy as the epitome of legal realism, I consider whether Holmes or Nietzsche would accept the matured realist movement, or rather prefer legal interpretivism

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