Normativity, Expertise and Epistemological Paternalism in the Philosophy of Science [Book Review]

Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 56 (2):229-241 (2019)
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Abstract

For almost 50 years the journal Metaphilosophy has been publishing research on a wide range of philosophical issues from the fundamental questions of ontology, epistemology and the philosophy of science to applied studies on ethics, technology and STS. The following review focuses on a number of key questions that have become the stumbling block for investigations in epistemology, philosophy and methodology of science and STS. The spotlight here is on the issues of reestablishment of normativity in philosophy of science, related to the PSP turn; new perspectives on the “armchair philosophy” and the ex cathedra principle; the misuse of scientific data by the philosophers of science; experimental philosophy and the “undermined” authority of philosophical expertise; and also we’ll find out how epistemic paternalism may become a virtue of research practice.

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