Abstract

This dissertation explores the relation between truth and freedom in science, according to the thought of Karl Jaspers. The position taken is that the freedom of the human knower is an indispensable condition for the truth of his knowledge. In support of this position I argue that it is the use of our power of free choice in the process of thinking that makes it possible to claim genuine knowledge as a result. ;The knowledge typical of science is marked by rigorous cogency and universal validity. Moreover, it can be claimed to be objective by reason of the fact that it is rooted in the natures of things outside the mind. The independence of scientific knowledge from human subjectivity resides precisely in its ability to compel any mind whatsoever with the same background, the same data, and the same attentiveness in a study of a given phenomenon. ;But Jaspers' consideration of the inherent temporality of all human knowing points to the existence of volitional as well as intellectual factors in human knowing. Without a willingness to conform one's thought to the way things are and to be changed by the reality one knows, genuine objectivity and compelling cogency in scientific argument would be impossible. Truth, therefore, has freedom as an indispensable condition