Partial awareness and the illusion of phenomenal consciousness

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):510-510 (2007)
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Abstract

The dissociation Block provides between phenomenal and access consciousness (P-consciousness and A-consciousness) captures much of our intuition about conscious experience. However, it raises a major methodological puzzle, and is not uniquely supported by the empirical evidence. We provide an alternative interpretation based on the notion of levels of representation and partial awareness

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Author Profiles

Sid Kouider
École Normale Supérieure
Ned Block
New York University