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Transindividual Concurrence
In Marcia Baron & Michael Slote (eds.), Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 173–213 (2009-04-10)
Abstract
This chapter contains sections titled: The Distinctness of Types of Objectivity Morality and Disagreement Concluding Remarks.Author's Profile
transindividual concurrence epistemic objectivity in the sense just expounded ‐ scalar property rather than an all‐or‐nothing property epistemic objectivity is lacking – or is significantly diminished only if there is neither broad agreement on the answer to some question distinctness of types of objectivity ‐ objectivity qua strong existential mind‐independence not entailing objectivity qua transindividual concurrence, nor does the latter entail the former absence of any link of entailment between transindividual concurrence and determinate correctness ‐ is manifest not in relation to a whole practice or a whole body of thought morality and disagreement ‐ “then moral acceptance is noncognitive” causal inefficacy and persistent disagreement robust objectivity ‐ people operating within a domain representing to themselves and to one another how things stand therein
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